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Regulatory arbitrage is an indispensable element of regulatory competition as it provides reg-
ulatory substitutes for firms, and allows those firms to optimally benefit from such competition.
This also increases the elasticity of demand for regulators and engenders accountability among
them. Hedge funds, as paragons of exploiting regulatory discrepancies, are heavily criticized for
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lack of transparency, market discipline by itself cannot fully limit the potential externalities of
regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. These features weaken market signals and reduce the repu-
tational benefits of being subject to greater regulatory oversight. The lower reputational costs and
broad private investor exemptions in turn reduce the overall costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge
funds in comparison to other financial services providers and mainstream financial institutions,
and make it more likely for hedge funds to engage in regulatory arbitrage.
In a departure from mainstream research, which recommends regulatory coordination, coopera-
tion, harmonization, and consolidation as legal remedies to address problems originating from
regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds, this Article argues that such proposals are at best misguided
and at worst systemic risk amplifiers. Instead, this Article suggests that to reduce the likelihood of
regulatory arbitrage, instead of regulating hedge funds directly, the strategies for regulation should
focus on indirect regulation of the funds through their counterparties, creditors, and investors for
whom reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage tend to be significantly high.
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REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND HEDGE FUND 
REGULATION: THE NEED FOR A 
TRANSNATIONAL RESPONSE 
Hossein Nabilou* 
Regulatory arbitrage is an indispensable element of regulatory 
competition as it provides regulatory substitutes for firms, and allows 
those firms to optimally benefit from such competition. This also 
increases the elasticity of demand for regulators and engenders 
accountability among them. Hedge funds, as paragons of exploiting 
regulatory discrepancies, are heavily criticized for thwarting efforts to 
address systemic risk. This Article investigates the arbitrage-seeking 
behavior of hedge funds in a globally-fragmented financial regulatory 
framework. 
Despite its benefits, regulatory arbitrage involves certain costs. 
Although market discipline can constrain these negative externalities, 
due to certain idiosyncratic features of the hedge fund industry, such 
as the sophistication of investor base, operational mobility, higher 
attrition rate, and lack of transparency, market discipline by itself 
cannot fully limit the potential externalities of regulatory arbitrage by 
hedge funds. These features weaken market signals and reduce the 
reputational benefits of being subject to greater regulatory oversight. 
The lower reputational costs and broad private investor exemptions in 
turn reduce the overall costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds in 
comparison to other financial services providers and mainstream 
financial institutions, and make it more likely for hedge funds to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
In a departure from mainstream research, which recommends 
regulatory coordination, cooperation, harmonization, and 
consolidation as legal remedies to address problems originating from 
regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds, this Article argues that such 
proposals are at best misguided and at worst systemic risk amplifiers. 
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Instead, this Article suggests that to reduce the likelihood of 
regulatory arbitrage, instead of regulating hedge funds directly, the 
strategies for regulation should focus on indirect regulation of the 
funds through their counterparties, creditors, and investors for whom 
reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage tend to be significantly high. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
In regulation of economic activities, the alternatives are no longer 
between the two polar extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and 
government-central planning.1 The complexity of the modern financial 
                                                                                                                           
 1. SANFORD IKEDA, DYNAMICS OF THE MIXED ECONOMY: TOWARD A THEORY OF 
INTERVENTIONISM (2003). 
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system offers no viable solution other than a mixed economy within 
which private enterprises and the government must cooperate in order to 
shape economic incentives meaningfully. One of the challenging 
problems arising from having a mixed economy in place is determining 
where to draw the line between regulated markets and unregulated 
markets, and between lightly-regulated and heavily-regulated markets.2 
The discussion around hedge funds cannot be separated from their 
traditional development as private investment companies that have been 
granted special exemptions by regulatory systems due to their private 
status and high tolerance for risk. 
In addition, the globalization of financial markets poses serious 
challenges to regulatory regimes and their responses to address potential 
systemic effects of investment funds. Hedge funds are one of the global 
players of the investment world. However, their regulatory framework 
remains local. The cross-border reach of the modern trading infrastructure 
and the existing patchwork of financial regulatory regimes enables 
circumvention of the specific mandates of individual regimes in a 
globally-fragmented financial regulatory system. The regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities arising in this fragmented regulatory framework coupled 
with economic firms’ desire to maximize their profits by reducing their 
regulatory costs incentivize exploitation of discrepancies. Hence, 
fragmented regulatory systems not only lead to the comingling of 
regulated economic activities with unregulated ones,3 but also result in 
regulatory arbitrage. 
Regulatory arbitrage has as long a history as regulation itself and is 
as ubiquitous as economic regulation. The first instances of regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
 2. See generally Charles Goodhart, The Boundary Problem in Financial 
Regulation, 206 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 48 (2008). 
 3. James W. McKie, Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of Boundaries, 
1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 66 (1970). 
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arbitrage are documented in the context of medical ethics4 and taxation.5 
In financial markets, the well-known example of religious prohibitions on 
interest sparked huge regulatory arbitrage activities. The advent of 
instruments such as murabaha transactions and ijara wa iqtina (leasing 
and promise to gift) in Islamic finance,6 and of mechanisms such as dry 
exchanges (cambio secco) and discretionary deposits7 was to circumvent 
the ban on riba8 in Islamic finance and interest in Christianity.9 Regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
 4. Durant reports about the widespread presence of tax evasion in ancient Greece. 
WILL DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE: THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION, VOL. 2 (2011). The 
great lawgiver of ancient Athens, Solon, was criticized on the account that the strong and 
the clever could escape his laws by twisting those laws to their advantage. Id. It is also 
well-documented that the Hippocratic code of medical ethics regarding abortion was 
systematically circumvented by physicians outsourcing the practice to midwives. Id. The 
modern equivalence of midwives in finance are the special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
designed to enjoy the exceptions from certain bankruptcy requirements (bankruptcy-
proof financing). 
 5. Not so far from Greece, Bartlett illustrates how differential tax treatment of 
citizens (especially small landowners) and slaves in the Roman Empire induced 
regulatory arbitrage. Bruce Bartlett, How Excessive Government Killed Ancient Rome, 
14 CATO J. 287, 300–01 (1994). Since landowner citizens were heavily taxed and slaves 
were tax exempt, the citizens used to change their civil status from citizen to slave to 
avoid excessive taxation. Id. He notes how, despite increases in tax rates, the tax revenues 
decreased, which in turn contributed to the further decline of the Roman Empire. Id. 
 6. Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early 
History of Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2008). It is also argued that 
most Islamic finance instruments were invented to circumvent the restrictions that Sharia 
law places on riba (interest) and gharar (excessive uncertainty) in financial contracts. 
See MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE 
(2006). 
 7. See generally TIM PARKS, MEDICI MONEY: BANKING, METAPHYSICS AND ART IN 
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY FLORENCE (2013). 
 8. In Islamic finance, it is believed riba is different from interest. See generally 
ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-JAZIRI, AL-FIQH ‘ALA AL-MADHAHIB AL-ARBA’AH (1986); TIMUR 
KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW HELD BACK THE MIDDLE EAST 
(2011). 
 9. Ferguson demonstrates how Jews dominated the financial markets of medieval 
Europe by interpreting the Bible in a certain way to circumvent its ban on interest. See 
NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST (2011). Kuran illustrates how 
indigenous Christians and Jews of the Middle East dominated the most profitable 
economic sectors in the region, especially in banking and insurance, through the choice 
of law. Timur Kuran, Why the Middle East Is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical 
Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2004). Such a 
freedom to choose to be subject to their own laws enabled them to escape the restrictions 
posed by Islamic economic institutions while Muslims themselves lacked such an option. 
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arbitrage reached its zenith in the globalization and information age.10 In 
modern times, the globalization of trade and finance gave traders more 
informational advantages. Coupled with the absence of global 
coordination, such a trend amplified the likelihood, magnitude, and 
frequency of regulatory arbitrage.11 
A hedge fund can be defined as a privately organized investment 
vehicle “with a specific fee structure not widely available to the public, 
aimed at generating absolute returns irrespective of market movements 
(alpha)12 through active trading and other strategies.”13 Hedge funds are 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Indeed, it was impossible for Muslims to convert (punishable by death sentence) to 
another religion (restructure the business entity) and take advantage of other regulatory 
jurisdictions. Id. However, such a reorganization or change in civil status was allowed in 
the Roman Empire. Id. 
 10. Indeed, globalization decreased regulators’ power by harnessing more regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities for firms that did not prefer the regulatory policies of their 
jurisdiction. Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory 
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1357 (2003). 
 11. More recently, it was argued that regulatory arbitrage was one of the main 
reasons for the fall of the Glass-Steagall wall in 1999. Viral V. Acharya, Paul Wachtel & 
Ingo Walter, International Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 368 (Viral V. Acharya & 
Matthew Richardson eds., 2009). In China, since there have been strict restrictions on 
lending within the country (China’s benchmark interest rate being 6%, while the same 
rate in Hong Kong being 0.5%), Chinese companies use trade finance instruments to 
borrow money offshore at much lower interest rates. See Wei Shen, Competing for 
Renminbi: Financial Centers in the Context of Renminbi Globalization, in 
RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 198, 198-99 (Ross P. 
Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2016). The regulatory arbitrage 
activities are not limited to the prohibitions or caps on interest rates; it would happen in 
any other context. For example, the recent tightening and enforcement actions against 
banking secrecy laws might result in the rise of organizations offering alternative 
unreported channels for funds. Such restrictions on banking might even create incentives 
for firms to relocate the deposits to the least compliant bank havens.. See Ruth Plato-
Shinar, Cross-Border Banking: Reconceptualising Bank Secrecy, in 
RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 249 (2014); see also Niels 
Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G-20 
Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J. 65, 65 (2014). 
 12. The alpha measures the excess return of a fund relative to a benchmark index. 
Simply put, the alpha shows by how much a hedge fund outperforms the markets, which 
can serve as a measurement of managerial skill. See William A. Roach Jr., Hedge Fund 
Regulation: “What Side of the Hedges Are You on?”, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 166 (2009) 
(arguing that generation of returns is one of the significant features of hedge funds). 
 13. For a definition of hedge funds, see Hossein Nabilou, The Conundrum of Hedge 
Fund Definition, 14 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 149 (2017). 
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historically viewed as paragons of exploiting regulatory discrepancies. 
Moreover, the recent global financial crisis triggered a debate about their 
contribution to the event. Thus far, there is plenty of literature on the 
potential systemic externalities of hedge funds. The debate about hedge 
funds and their role in the financial crisis easily lent itself to political 
abuse on both sides of the Atlantic.14 Although different explanations are 
presented for such an unprecedented regulatory animosity towards hedge 
funds,15 the post-crisis anti-hedge fund sentiment can partly be understood 
against a background of hedge funds gaming regulatory regimes by 
engaging in regulatory arbitrage. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines and analyzes the 
concept and dynamics of regulatory arbitrage. Part II explains regulatory 
arbitrage in the context of regulatory competition, and discusses its 
virtues—in terms of delivering the benefits of regulatory competition—
and its social costs (or negative externalities). Part III elucidates the role 
of market discipline and government regulation in reducing the social 
costs of regulatory arbitrage, and evaluates the reasons for the failure of 
market mechanisms to address the social costs of regulatory arbitrage by 
hedge funds. Part IV discusses the role of public policy responses in 
constraining the negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage and 
highlights the role of indirect regulation in addressing such problems. 
Finally, the Article concludes by noting that indirect regulation can better 
address the potential externalities of regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. 
I. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE: CONCEPT AND DYNAMICS 
Arbitrage is “the exploitation of a price difference between two 
goods that are essentially the same.”16 Arbitrage often takes place where 
                                                                                                                           
 14. Politicians demonized hedge funds as being “crazy” and “hellish” which “fall 
like a plague of locusts over [the] companies, devour everything, then fly on to the next 
one.” Sebastian Mallaby, Hands off Hedge Funds, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 91, 92 (2007) 
(quoting Franz Müntefering, Germany’s former deputy chancellor); Lex Column, The 
Italian Locust, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 16, 2008. 
 15. Romano argues that such a move toward regulating hedge funds is 
understandable in the traditional wariness toward short-selling activities. See Roberta 
Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment (Yale L. & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 414, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=16 
97348 [https://perma.cc/SRJ9-7MK6]. 
 16. Andreas Engert, Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
REV. 329, 357 (2010). 
2017]      REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND 563 
                                   HEDGE FUND REGULATION 
the prices of identical goods are different in two markets. In addition to 
the price differentials stemming from market inefficiencies, some of these 
differences arise from different regulatory schemes. To understand 
regulatory arbitrage, regulatory requirements should be viewed as the 
price of conducting certain business activities in a particular jurisdiction. 
In this context, differential regulatory treatment of homogenous activities 
in different jurisdictions imposes differential costs on identical economic 
activities. Accordingly, the goods and services produced within two 
different jurisdictions will have different fixed costs. This difference in 
fixed costs will affect the price of final products and services. 
A firm, which is free to choose between two jurisdictions with 
differential regulatory costs will engage in business at lower regulatory 
costs.17 Therefore, regulatory arbitrage, broadly defined, refers to shifting 
activities from a heavily regulated financial sector to an unregulated or 
lightly regulated financial sector with the aim of maximizing profits by 
taking advantage of regulatory differentials. In essence, “regulatory 
arbitrage exploits the gap between the economic substance of a 
transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.”18 
Regulatory arbitrage can also be seen as an unintended consequence 
of effective regulation. Effective regulation is costly and “is likely to 
penalize those within the regulated sector, relative to those just outside, 
causing substitution flows towards the unregulated.”19 Firms engaged in 
regulatory arbitrage often do so to avoid taxes, strict accounting 
standards, disclosure requirements, and regulatory burdens.20 Although 
there are different mechanisms to engage in regulatory arbitrage, the most 
popular and apparently the least costly mechanism involves restructuring 
a deal.21 For instance, most financial derivatives were designed to take 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities.22 Derivatives and strategies 
exploiting such market discrepancies enable market participants to avoid 
financial regulations and tax burdens.23 
                                                                                                                           
 17. Id. 
 18. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229. 
 19. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 48. 
 20. Fleischer, supra note 18, at 229. 
 21. Id. at 230. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of 
Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 
53, 57 (1995). 
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Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage may arise within one single 
jurisdiction or between two or more jurisdictions. “Intra-jurisdiction 
regulatory arbitrage”24 arises where one jurisdiction treats some financial 
activities differently from other similar activities, thereby subjecting the 
same financial activities or methods to governance under different rules. 
In the presence of such differential regulation, if there are two methods of 
achieving the same outcome within one jurisdiction and one method costs 
less than the other, ceteris paribus, a profit-maximizing firm will choose 
the method involving lower costs either by restructuring its legal entity 
(institutional engineering) or by shifting the business activities towards 
the lower cost method using legal and financial engineering. The latter 
form is achieved either by specifically tailoring the features of a financial 
product or by choosing the markets in which trades will take place. 
Needless to say, both methods involve legal and financial engineering, 
which mainly involve the use of derivatives. 
It is well-acknowledged that one of the driving forces behind 
financial innovation has been financial regulation.25 Indeed, some 
financial innovations are “designed to keep regulators in the dark.”26 
Financial regulation follows the logic and dynamics of influence and 
change in the behavior of regulated industries. From this perspective, 
most financial innovations were strategic responses to regulations. 
Financial institutions have created an array of innovative derivative 
instruments to circumvent regulation or decrease the costs of compliance. 
For example, Gorton and Metrick identify regulatory changes as one of 
the major factors giving rise to shadow banks, the other being private 
innovation.27 In their work, the rise of shadow banking is mainly 
attributed to the regulatory developments within the past four decades that 
benefited certain categories of financial institutions and instruments to the 
detriment of their close substitutes. The main beneficiaries of these 
regulatory changes were money market mutual funds (“MMMFs”) 
substituting bank deposits, securitization used for off-balance-sheet 
                                                                                                                           
 24. It seems that what Charles Goodhart dubs a “boundary problem” is the same as 
intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage. See Goodhart, supra note 2. 
 25. Merton Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 459 (1986); see also Frank Partnoy, Financial 
Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1996). 
 26. Jean Tirole, Lessons from the Crisis, in BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 29 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2010). 
 27. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 269. 
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financing, and repurchase agreements (“repos”) which made it possible 
to use securitized bonds as money.28 
Needless to say, not only does shadow banking include MMMFs, but 
it also includes hedge funds, private equity funds, proprietary trading 
desks of traditional banks and other similar institutions essentially 
engaging in maturity transformation.29 
On the other hand, “inter-jurisdiction regulatory arbitrage”30 arises 
from differential regulatory treatment of identical business activities in 
different jurisdictions.31 In this case, absent international financial 
coordination, regulatory arbitrage may arise across various national 
jurisdictions. The principle of sovereignty in international law, which 
entitles states to independently manage their internal economic affairs and 
exclude other nation-states from interfering with their domestic affairs, is 
the main reason for the differential regulatory treatment of homogenous 
activities in different jurisdictions.32 Regardless of its form, regulatory 
arbitrage is heavily criticized for neutralizing efforts to address systemic 
risks.33 
                                                                                                                           
 28. Id. at 261. 
 29. See Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Model of Shadow 
Banking (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1711, 2011). 
 30. In Charles Goodhart’s terminology, this would correspond to the “border 
problem.” See Charles A. E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Border Problems, 13 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 705, 714-15 (2010). 
 31. Engert, supra note 16, at 357-58. 
 32. Such an independent approach to domestic markets came under immense 
pressure with rising forces of globalization. In addition to the above considerations for 
differential regulatory treatment, the role of exogenous factors should not be overlooked. 
Factors, such as lobbying, are a permanent feature of financial regulation. For example, 
Partnoy argues that the securities industry itself has played a major role in shaping the 
structure of the existing regulation. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the 
Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 225 (1997). He attributes the existence 
of regulatory exemptions mostly to industry lobbying. See id. 
 33. For example, Acharya and Richardson believe that regulatory capital arbitrage 
was at the heart of the recent financial crisis. See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson, Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 1, 10 (2012); 
see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RISK TAKING, 
LIQUIDITY, AND SHADOW BANKING: CURBING EXCESS WHILE PROMOTING GROWTH 89 
(2014). In Stein’s view, there are two driving forces behind securitizations: risk-sharing 
and regulatory arbitrage. See Jeremy C. Stein, Securitization, Shadow Banking & 
Financial Fragility, 139 DAEDALUS 41, 45 (2010). The collapse of the securitized 
markets in turn played a major role in causing the financial crisis. See id. 
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II. CAUSES OF REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 
There are two major causes of regulatory arbitrage. The first is the 
differential regulatory treatment of homogenous business activities, and 
the second is the ambiguity in the interpretation of the applicable laws. 
Differential regulatory treatment arises from financial market 
compartmentalization, regulatory competition, and partial industry 
regulatory strategies. 
A. DIFFERENTIAL REGULATORY TREATMENT OF HOMOGENOUS 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 
It is often argued that similar institutions undertaking similar 
functions should be regulated similarly.34 Otherwise, regulatory loopholes 
may be abused by financial institutions as an unintended consequence of 
a regulation that treats identical activities differently, or a regulation that 
involves institutional regulation and treats homogenous institutions 
heterogeneously. Therefore, the main reason for regulatory arbitrage is 
the fragmentation of the regulatory structure throughout the globe and 
within a particular jurisdiction. 
Regarding the intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, the need for 
differentiated regulation creates regulatory bifurcation. Although there 
are obvious benefits of subjecting identical firms and financial products 
to a single regulator, resulting in better coordination and a level playing 
field, unequal and differential treatment of the identical components or 
subsets of an industry has its own proponents who advocate for regulatory 
competition and underscore its efficiency-enhancing features. Needless to 
say, such a system can lead to fragmentation, which can provide potential 
opportunities for intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage.35 
Differential regulatory treatment of homogenous financial activities 
has three major explanations: financial market compartmentalization, 
which provides the grounds for differential regulatory treatment;36 the 
benefits of regulatory competition, which lead to the subjection of 
                                                                                                                           
 34. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 33. 
 35. Romano, supra note 15, at 19. 
 36. In financial markets, institutional financial regulation tends to segment financial 
markets and institutions. For example, in most jurisdictions, deposit taking and lending 
are regulated activities in which only banks (depository institutions, or credit institutions) 
can engage. This by itself can result in market segmentation and can make banks special. 
See E. GERALD CORRIGAN, ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1983). 
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different firms to governance under different rules;37 and the partial 
industry regulation theory, which supports differential regulation to 
enhance competition among regulated firms.38 This Article focuses on 
regulatory competition and its role in encouraging hedge funds to engage 
in regulatory arbitrage. 
B. FINANCIAL MARKET COMPARTMENTALIZATION 
Financial regulation is a function of the financial system itself, and 
regulatory fragmentation is a product of financial market 
compartmentalization. Around three decades ago, Corrigan, among 
others, argued that banks are special, and hence require special regulatory 
treatment. In his view, offering transaction accounts, providing backup 
liquidity for all other financial and non-financial institutions, and serving 
as a transmission belt for monetary policy were three features that 
distinguished banks from other financial and non-financial institutions.39 
Almost two decades later, accounting for the development of close 
substitutes for banks’ services,40 he repeated the same arguments with 
slight differences.41 This “specialness” argument presupposes that even 
after accounting for dynamic behavior of different classes of institutions, 
the financial services industry can be compartmentalized.42 
This argument reasons that the nature and function of financial 
institutions differentiate them from one another. Therefore, based on their 
                                                                                                                           
 37. For more information regarding the arguments for regulatory competition by 
implementing a competitive federalism approach, see Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2366 
(1998). See also Damien Geradin & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Co-opetition: 
Transcending the Regulatory Competition Debate (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 2005–06). 
 38. This phenomenon is sometimes called regulatory bifurcation. See Erich Schanze, 
Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: The Regulation of Markets That Have Escaped Regulated 
Markets, 151 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 162, 162 (1995). 
 39. CORRIGAN, supra note 36, at 7. 
 40. See, e.g., Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 557, 577 (1984). 
 41. CORRIGAN, supra note 36, at 1-2; E. GERALD CORRIGAN, ARE BANKS SPECIAL?: 
A REVISITATION (2000). However, other scholars do not agree with the “specialness” 
argument for banks. See, e.g., ANAT R. ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ 
NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013). 
 42. RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2009). 
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specialization in certain instruments and strategies, different financial 
institutions yield heterogeneous benefits, become subject to idiosyncratic 
risks, and pose different risks to the financial system. 
Contemporary history of financial regulation is abound with 
examples of fragmented regulation. For instance, the U.S. Glass-Steagall 
Act separated commercial banking from investment banking and 
subjected commercial and investment banks to two different regulatory 
regimes and agencies (the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal 
Reserve, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
respectively). The primary rationale behind the Glass-Steagall Act was to 
prevent the conflicts of interest and risk taking behavior that typically 
resulted from comingling commercial and investment banking activities. 
In other words, it was argued that since investment banking is different 
from commercial banking in terms of its functions and potential risks, 
consolidation of these two activities together in one financial firm can 
create severe conflicts of interests. 
Likewise, the compartmentalization argument can be offered for 
differential regulatory treatment of hedge funds. For this purpose, 
differential treatment of hedge funds can best be understood in light of 
hedge funds’ specific functions in the overall financial system and their 
potential costs and benefits. Hedge funds occupy a relatively sui generis 
position in the financial system and provide “special” and idiosyncratic 
benefits that other financial institutions, given their nature and function, 
are unable to provide.43 
Hedge funds provide diversification benefits.44 This means that 
investing in hedge funds can improve the risk-return relationship for 
investors.45 In addition, during periods of negative equity returns, 
investing in hedge funds can decrease the volatility of a portfolio by 
offsetting market movements.46 For example, an allocation of ten to 
twenty percent of a portfolio to alternative investments, including hedge 
                                                                                                                           
 43. Needless to say, these sui generis functions are made possible first and foremost 
by the special regulatory treatment of hedge funds by the financial regulators. 
 44. Wouter Van Eechoud et al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk 
Perspective, 19 FIN. MKTS., INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 269, 275-78 (2010). 
 45. Thomas Schneeweis, Vassilios N. Karavas & Georgi Georgiev, Alternative 
Investments in the Institutional Portfolio 5 (Ctr. for Int’l. Sec. & Derivatives Mkts. 
Working Paper Series, 2002). 
 46. Id. 
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funds, is recommended for pension funds that strive for a long-term 
strategy of low risk and low returns.47 
Moreover, hedge funds are sources of liquidity.48 This is especially 
notable in niche markets and during liquidity crises.49 By investing in sub-
markets that are “less liquid, more complex and hard-to-value,” such as 
convertible bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps, hedge funds 
can complete and deepen financial markets.50 In fact, in recent years the 
growth and development of some niche markets, such as those for 
unsecured and subordinated debt, is attributed to or correlated with the 
growth of hedge funds willing to take risks that other traditional financial 
institutions, such as banks, are unwilling to take.51 
In addition, hedge funds’ aim of generating alpha by outperforming 
markets is mostly achieved through exploiting market imperfections and 
discrepancies.52 This function of hedge funds is beneficial to financial 
markets because it facilitates and accelerates price discovery by eroding 
arbitrage opportunities.53 Furthermore, the legal protections for hedge 
funds’ proprietary information induce them to invest in the acquisition of 
private information on which almost no disclosure requirement is 
imposed. This enables hedge funds to discover and exploit mispriced 
assets and securities, which, in turn, can result in more efficient markets 
by pushing the securities prices to their true or fundamental values.54 
Moreover, such proprietary investment in information acquisition can 
significantly increase the role of hedge funds in disciplining the 
underperforming firms and, in some cases, uncovering fraudulent 
                                                                                                                           
 47. Id.; see also William F. Sharpe, Asset Allocation: Management Style and 
Performance Measurement, 18 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 7 (1992). 
 48. See Robert J. Bianchi & Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic 
Risk, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 13, 13-15 (2010). See generally Francesco Franzoni & Alberto 
Plazzi, Hedge Funds’ Liquidity Provision and Trading Activity (2012). 
 49. The provision of liquidity by hedge funds in niche markets became mostly 
possible because of the differential regulatory treatment applied to them in terms of the 
lack of limits on the amount of leverage, investment concentration, short selling, and use 
of structured products and derivatives. 
 50. Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, 275-278. 
 51. Bianchi & Drew, supra note 48, 13-15. 
 52. In fact, the lack of legal restrictions on hedge funds’ use of financial instruments 
and strategies along with their investment concentrations enables them to use a wide 
range of techniques to exploit market imperfections. 
 53. Andrew Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 19, 22 (2007). 
 54. Roach Jr., supra note 12, at 173. 
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activities.55 Therefore, some argue that having larger and greater number 
of hedge funds can contribute to the efficiency of markets.56 
It is also easier for hedge funds to take contrarian positions in 
financial markets. Again, the unlimited use of leverage, short selling,57 
limited investor liquidity (i.e., through limited redemption rights or longer 
lock-ups), unlimited possibilities to invest in derivatives, and unrestrained 
investment concentration potentially enable hedge funds to take positions 
that other financial institutions cannot due to the regulatory capital 
requirements imposed on the latter. This can smooth and reduce market 
volatility and reduce the number and volume of asset price bubbles.58 Not 
surprisingly, empirical evidence suggests that the leverage of hedge funds 
is countercyclical to that of listed financial intermediaries, meaning that 
given the pro-cyclicality of leverage in other financial institutions, hedge 
funds’ leverage has an inverse relationship with the leverage of other 
major financial market participants.59 In other words, when the leverage 
of the mainstream financial institutions increases during a financial boom, 
the leverage of hedge funds tends to decrease; in a financial downturn or 
credit crunch, the leverage of mainstream financial institutions decreases 
while hedge fund leverage tends to increase. This feature, coupled with 
the unlimited capability of hedge funds to leverage their contrarian 
positions, amplifies the effects of such positions. As a result, the 
contrarian position taken by hedge funds can smooth the volatility of 
financial markets. Indeed, their contrarian strategies enable them to be 
active traders during financial crises. This feature of hedge funds can 
                                                                                                                           
 55. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism 1093 (Harv., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper 
No. 802, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577 [https://pe 
rma.cc/PW9Y-VZHC]. 
 56. Crockett, supra note 53, at 22-23. 
 57. In order to take a short position, the trader usually borrows the securities from a 
dealer and sells them to the market with the expectation that the price of the securities 
will be lower at a certain point in the future at which the trader will again buy them back 
and return them to the dealer. By doing so, the short seller pockets the difference between 
the higher sale price and the lower purchase price at which he bought them back and 
returned them to the dealer. 
 58. Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 275-78. 
 59. This means that hedge funds can be liquidity providers in times of a liquidity 
crunch. See Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy & Gregory B. van Inwegen, Hedge Fund 
Leverage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 102 (2011). Their empirical study suggests that, unlike other 
financial institutions such as banks, hedge funds’ leverage decreased prior to the start of 
the financial crisis. Id. 
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potentially form a price floor in distressed markets. Financial institutions, 
such as banks, cannot play such a role, especially because of the Basel-
like capital adequacy requirements which apply to all depositary 
institutions.60 Therefore, hedge funds contribute to the stability of 
financial markets through liquidity provision and significant risk 
diversification.61 More importantly, the composition of hedge funds’ 
investors and the mechanisms used to lock up capital for longer periods 
make it possible for hedge funds to maintain their positions, which are 
against the conventional market perceptions and price movements, for 
longer periods of time.62 Unlike mutual funds and banks, hedge funds are 
not required to provide cash redemption on short notice. The right to 
redeem alternative investments is often governed by private contracts 
which may impose longer lock-up periods on investors’ capital.63 In 
particular, gates and side-pocket arrangements within the purview of 
private ordering can provide another tool for hedge funds to restrict 
investor exits.64 This freedom from liquidity constraints gives hedge funds 
additional tools and techniques to better manage liquidity risks, and 
enables them to strive for their long-term goals in their investment 
strategies.65 
All in all, hedge funds can “contribute substantially to capital 
formation, market efficiency, price discovery, and liquidity.”66 
Regulatory agencies have also long acknowledged the benefits of hedge 
                                                                                                                           
 60. Jón Daníelson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 30 (2007). 
 61. Jean-Pierre Mustier & Alain Dubois, Risks and Return of Banking Activities 
Related to Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 85, 88-89 (2007). 
 62. Crockett, supra note 53, at 22. 
 63. See Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 277. 
 64. See Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44. 
 65. In terms of maturity transformation, hedge funds stand in between banks and 
mutual funds (with higher maturity transformation) on the one hand, and the pension 
funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds on the other hand. Despite 
arguments to the contrary, it seems that hedge funds play a limited role in liquidity 
transformation. See Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 275-78. However, it is 
suggested that recently hedge funds are engaging more and more in liquidity 
transformation. Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 573 (2011). 
 66. Roach Jr., supra note 12, at 173 (quoting Concerning the Regulation of Hedge 
Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 
(July 25, 2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n)). 
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funds to the financial system.67 Even after the financial crisis, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions suggested that 
hedge funds should be compensated for their intermediary functions and 
willingness to take risks that other financial market participants are 
unwilling to take.68 
The private investor exemptions that require hedge funds to have 
limits on the number and qualifications of their investors generally rules 
out further regulation on the grounds of investor protection, while such 
an argument does not hold for banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies as their investors and depositors are generally 
unsophisticated. 
On the other hand, the choice of organizational form (LLP or LLC) 
for hedge funds may automatically trigger certain mandatory rules such 
as general partners’ (managers’) co-investment in hedge funds and their 
potential joint liability.69 These features substantially align managers’ 
incentives with the interest of the investors and to a large extent eliminate 
the need for imposing corporate governance standards on hedge funds that 
are required for banks and mutual funds. 
Needless to say, sustaining such benefits and addressing potential 
risks of hedge funds to financial markets call for their special regulatory 
treatment.70 In addition to compartmentalization, two other factors 
contribute to the regulatory bifurcation of hedge funds around the globe: 
regulatory competition and partial industry regulation. 
                                                                                                                           
 67. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 4-5 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/4K8N-PPJC]. 
 68. See Bianchi & Drew, supra note 48, at 13-15. From this perspective, the special 
regulatory treatment of hedge funds can be considered to be a compensation package for 
the benefits they provide, such as contributing to liquidity in illiquid markets, helping the 
price discovery mechanism become more efficient, distributing risk, contributing to 
financial integration, and aiding in diversification. 
 69. FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 85-87 (2006). 
 70. Needless to say, this differentiation requires different regulatory treatment for 
different financial institutions. Differentiation breeds tailor-made regulation, and tailor-
made regulation amplifies differentiation. On the other hand, the special regulatory 
privileges (subsidies) offered to banks justified a separate set of regulations for them. 
Therefore, differences in function, regulatory framework (such as tax treatments, 
subsidies, and deposit insurance), and organization breed more differential regulatory 
treatments, which makes financial markets more compartmentalized. 
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C. REGULATORY COMPETITION 
Prior to the information age and globalization, competition among 
regulators to attract more businesses was not as fierce.71 As globalization 
intensified, the excess capital in international markets resembled the 
scenario of “water run[ning] to find its level”72 with an unprecedented 
pace. It is in this context that the race to attract more businesses started 
among turf-seeking regulators. 
Regulatory competition was further accelerated by technological 
advancements such as the internet and increasingly diminished 
transaction costs, which in turn reduced transaction processing and 
clearing times. In such hyper-connected73 global markets, investors 
become an “economic herd”74 capable of instantaneously shifting 
business across regulatory borders. This allowed firms to take advantage 
of regulatory arbitrage opportunities at an unprecedented pace. In the 
United States, competition for businesses occurs among the states, which 
may explain why the theory of regulatory competition is so inextricably 
intertwined with debates about federalism. Against this background, 
regulatory competition emerged as an “economic theory of government 
organization.”75 
While a unitary or consolidated regulator can more consistently 
regulate business activities, competition among regulators creates 
exploitable gaps and fractures that can undermine their objectives. In the 
regulatory competition literature, the original theory explaining 
government output of regulation was predicated on a model that accepts 
                                                                                                                           
 71. Regulatory competition has a long history, perhaps longer than regulatory 
arbitrage. The historian Will Durant reports that in Ancient Athens, to stimulate 
commerce and industry, Solon started granting citizenship to skillful foreign businessmen 
and their families. See WILL DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE: THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION 
(2011). Niall Ferguson demonstrates how unitary government and uniformity led to 
stagnation in ancient China, whereas competition between national jurisdictions in 
divided Europe contributed to the long-term development and subsequent domination of 
Europe. See NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST (2011). 
 72. See generally WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET (1873). 
 73. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO 
BE US: HOW AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN 
COME BACK, VOL I (2011). 
 74. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: 
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (2000). 
 75. See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37. 
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regulation as a public good.76 The literature on regulatory competition 
suggests that the provision of laws and regulations is similar to the 
provision of goods and services by economic firms: governments are 
suppliers of regulation just as firms are suppliers of products and services 
in the marketplace, and thus, should be disciplined by the same forces.77 
Advocates of localism argue that localities and states provide 
economic efficiency by generating plurality and extending opportunities 
for citizens to move into localities that provide a better allocation of 
services and taxes.78 Local jurisdictions are supposed to compete for 
scarce economic resources, equivalent to excess capital found in financial 
markets. In their quest to attract investment and serve the best interests of 
their constituents (or to extend their regulatory turf), local regulators 
should offer the best quality of regulation to attract more customers (i.e., 
regulated entities). Charles Tiebout’s seminal work advocated the idea of 
“voting with the feet” for citizens who are dissatisfied with the provision 
of local public goods in a specific state or locality.79 Under this model, the 
local governments within a federal framework that provide the optimal 
level of regulation should attract more mobile economic resources.80 
Under this theory, a unitary regulator would serve as a monopolist, 
and regulatory harmonization would be regarded as anticompetitive 
cartelization, which would result in inefficiencies. In contrast, a system 
                                                                                                                           
 76. The need for regulation arises from market failure. The aim of such regulation 
should be correcting market failures and imperfections. Regulation itself has a public 
goods feature and in the absence of third party action, it will not be provided or it will be 
underprovided. The public goods nature of provision of regulation suggests that the 
government having monopoly over “the legitimate use of force within the given territory” 
has to take action to provide it. As the public goods nature of regulation suggests, its rise 
and the method of its study can be investigated similarly to the other systems of provision 
of public goods. As the government has the monopoly on the provision of such public 
goods which requires taking certain actions which private parties cannot, it seems very 
counterintuitive to speak of the regulatory competition. especially within the unitary 
states. See Tyler Cowen, Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy, 8 ECON. & 
PHIL. 249, 249 (1992). 
 77. One of the first systematic studies of provision of public goods is conducted in 
the American local government context focusing on the debate about localism vs. 
regionalism and the state vs. federal government dichotomy context. 
 78. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: 
A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 753 
(2000). 
 79. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416, 416 (1956). 
 80. Id. 
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of multiple decentralized regulatory agencies competing for customers, 
i.e., economic firms, is supposed to result in more efficient results, namely 
enhanced quality of regulation with competitive prices.81 For example, it 
is argued that “the incessant turf battles” among American financial 
regulatory authorities are equivalent to competition among private 
businesses.82 This disciplines regulators by the threat of loss of their 
market share or regulatory clientele to other agencies, thereby promoting 
diligence and competence among regulators.83 
Advocates of regulatory competition often appeal to arguments in 
favor of decentralization.84 Decentralization mitigates information 
asymmetries, decreases the likelihood of regulatory capture, and 
encourages more experimentation which allows for alternative 
solutions.85 It also induces more innovation, and results in differentiated 
and customized services adapted to local circumstances and the needs of 
the constituency. The decentralized model of provision of public goods 
increases economic efficiency by satisfying the differential preferences in 
the locally needed public goods.86 Therefore, since the optimal level of 
local public goods in different localities is varied, governments can 
provide a better allocation of local services in a decentralized structure.87 
In the same vein, regulatory arbitrage plays an important role in 
delivering the benefits of regulatory competition. In contrast to unitary 
regulatory systems or regulatory monopolies in which the demand for 
regulation is inelastic, regulatory arbitrage provides alternatives or 
regulatory substitutes for regulated firms and thereby makes the demand 
for regulation elastic.88 In the harmonized regulatory system, the demand 
for regulatory services will be constant, while in the regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
 81. See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37, at 3. 
 82. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 42, at 75. 
 83. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 42, at 65. 
 84. See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37, at 2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990). 
 87. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay On Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1120, 1121-22 (1999). Although devolution and decentralization which can encourage 
competition are more likely to generate efficient results, just as markets, there are two 
conditions for the achievement of goals in such a model of regulatory competition. First, 
there should be no externalities. Secondly, markets should be and remain open for free 
entry and exit of capital and labor. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European 
Business Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 125, 128 (1994). 
 88. See Macey, supra note 10, at 1362. 
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fragmentation model, ceteris paribus, the demand increases with more 
harmonization and decreases with more fragmentation. Therefore, 
harmonized regulatory jurisdictions will be less accountable and 
fragmented jurisdictions will be more accountable to their regulated 
firms. 
Such a dramatic change in the elasticity of demand means that if 
regulators cannot provide good quality regulations at competitive prices, 
regulated firms will desert them. Hence, this increased elasticity of 
demand engenders more accountability towards their clientele. On the 
other hand, this market or “downward accountability”89 will impose 
constraints on regulators and can serve as a safeguard against regulatory 
capture.90 Since regulators have an incentive to increase, or at least 
maintain, their market share of regulated entities,91 competition and the 
possibility of regulatory arbitrage will operate as a check on regulatory 
despotism by eliminating inefficient regulators. 
In addition, enhanced diversity among regulators can be effective in 
avoiding conflicts of interest in regulatory functions.92 By the same token, 
                                                                                                                           
 89. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 38, 42 
(2000). 
 90. Findings by Grabosky and Braithwaite show that regulatory agencies that 
regulate “(1) smaller numbers of client companies; (2) a single industry rather than 
diverse industries; (3) where the same inspectors were in regular contact with the same 
client companies; and (4) where the proportion of inspectors with a background in the 
regulated industry was high” are more likely to have a cooperative rather than 
prosecutorial regulatory practice. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE REGULATION DEBATE 55 (1992). The empirical 
findings in that regard confirm the theory that “the evolution of cooperation should occur 
only when regulator and firm are in a multi-period prisoner’s dilemma game. Repeated 
encounters are required for cooperation to evolve.” Id. When an agency regulates a small 
number of firms in a single industry, the likelihood of the repeated encounters is greater, 
which can pave the way for cooperation and corruption. Id. 
 91. See Macey, supra note 10, at 1362. 
 92. See Cristie L. Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the 
Global Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L. J. 257, 257 (2010). Some scholars raise questions 
about the regulatory arbitrage argument. For example, Zingales argues that since it is the 
managers and not the shareholders who choose regulators, such a regulatory regime can 
potentially suffer from agency problems. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities 
Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391, 401 (2009). On the other hand, it is suggested that 
regulatory competition may give rise to a “beggar thy neighbor” competitive approach to 
regulation and, absent financial regulatory coordination, create regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities for the firms inducing a regulatory race to the bottom, which enables 
financial institutions to circumvent effective financial regulation. See JAMES R. BARTH, 
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in the context of financial markets and hedge fund regulation, regulatory 
competition may deter cooperation and corruption between regulators and 
regulated firms. 
Moreover, regulatory competition provides market benchmarks or 
yardsticks against which the oversight of each regulator can be assessed 
among different groupings in a regulatory tournament, also known as 
“yardstick competition.”93 Such an arrangement for monitoring regulators 
is similar to mechanisms long used in labor contracts. In labor contracts, 
and especially in franchise agreements, the franchisor (regulator) is not 
able, or it is not cost-justified for her, to monitor the level of effort (input) 
of the franchisee, whereas the level of output is readily observable. In 
such a context, there are several methods to deal with this information 
asymmetry problem, such as “cost-of-service” regulation and “lagged 
price adjustment” mechanisms.94 However, both mechanisms can be 
equally inefficient; in such a setting, yardstick competition can achieve a 
more efficient outcome than the alternatives.95 
Where competition involves political agents, the tournament can be 
adopted in regulatory competition scenarios with the focus on 
competition among governments or regulators. Such an application rests 
on the assumption that the voters (regulated firms) lack full information 
about the quality of the input of politicians (regulators) and that they use 
                                                                                                                           
GERARD CAPRIO, JR & ROSS LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS 
GOVERN 68 (2006); see also Acharya et al., supra note 11. In addition, there is a trade-
off between regulatory capture and regulatory harmonization. Features of regulatory 
competition that induce regulatory arbitrage decrease the likelihood of regulatory 
capture. But the regulatory harmonization can decrease the likelihood of regulatory 
arbitrage while increasing the likelihood of regulatory capture. 
 93. Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319–
20 (1985). 
 94. Id. The equivalent of the “cost-of-service” regulation for regulating regulators is 
making their pay dependent on performance (by estimating the costs of performance and 
paying them accordingly), while the equivalent of the “lagged price adjustment” is the 
deferred compensation schemes for regulators. Id. 
 95. Id. Recent studies show that incentive-based pay schemes outperform fixed pay 
and that tournament theory is less effective than piece rate in certain settings. See 
generally M. ALI CHOUDHARY, VASCO J. GABRIEL & NEIL RICKMAN, INDIVIDUAL 
INCENTIVES AND WORKERS’ CONTRACTS: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT (2012). 
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other politicians’ performance as a yardstick or benchmark to evaluate the 
performance of their own politicians.96 
There are several studies emphasizing the welfare-enhancing 
features of regulatory competition in financial regulation.97 For example, 
regulatory competition among accounting standards and the ability to 
choose the regulators and corporate structures within and across 
international boundaries would improve the efficiency of corporate 
governance and accounting standards, and eventually lead to a lower cost 
of capital. Thus, competitive accounting regimes are more efficient than 
monopolistic ones, even internationally.98 Moreover, within this cross-
jurisdictional regulatory competition, financial institutions can sidestep 
costly and stifling regulations leading to a higher allocative efficiency in 
capital markets.99 
Despite the benefits of regulatory competition and regulatory 
arbitrage, they impose social costs or externalities. Most importantly, 
regulatory arbitrage imposes systemic externalities on financial markets. 
After the recent global financial crisis, skeptics question whether 
regulatory competition leads firms to migrate to poorly-regulated 
jurisdictions or whether it curbs a regulatory race to the bottom.100 
D. PARTIAL INDUSTRY REGULATION 
An additional explanation for differential treatment of homogenous 
economic activities is predicated on the partial-industry regulation 
(“PIR”) model.101 The PIR model is built on an understanding that the 
“government regulates only a part of the industry, leaving another part 
unregulated. Under partial-industry regulatory schemes, government 
                                                                                                                           
 96. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of 
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 201, 256-58 (1997). 
 97. For more information regarding the reasons for the regulatory competition by 
implementing the competitive federalism approach, see Romano, supra note 37. 
 98. Shyam Sunder, Regulatory Competition Among Accounting Standards Within 
and Across International Boundaries, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2002). 
 99. Joel F. Houston, Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory Arbitrage and International 
Bank Flows, 67 J. FIN. 1845, 1846 (2012). 
 100. Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, 
Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 719, 719 (2010). 
 101. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony 
Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 13 (1992); see also AYRES & 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 6. 
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purposefully treats firms in an industry differently.”102 This regulatory 
strategy is a middle path between full-industry regulation and laissez-faire 
policies, as it attempts to balance the virtues of both. The proponents of 
this approach argue that, in certain industry and regulatory settings, 
regulation of an individual firm (or a subset of firms) within a particular 
industry can be more efficient because it would avoid the costs of opting 
for either sweeping industry-wide intervention or a complete laissez-faire 
position.103 In contrast to regulatory competition, which aims to enhance 
competition among regulators, PIR tries to stimulate competition within 
the regulated industry.104 In other words, the PIR strategies’ goal is to 
harness the competitive forces of the market to enhance market 
discipline.105 The main advantage of this approach is that it can use 
regulated firms to effect a behavioral change in other firms within the 
industry.106 In addition, this diversified regulatory approach—which is 
sometimes called “regulatory bifurcation”107—can provide additional 
advantages such as mitigating the adverse effects of regulatory errors, 
furnishing a competitive check on the regulators’ decisions by ensuring 
that the unregulated firm enjoys higher degrees of independence from the 
regulator, and inducing monitoring mechanisms among regulated 
firms.108 
In such a scheme, the regulated and unregulated sections of an 
industry can check one another’s abuses. Such a regulatory scheme can 
eventually harness market accountability or downward accountability.109 
Put differently, PIR can be viewed as a form of regulatory delegation or 
indirect regulation in which regulated firms can ensure that the 
unregulated firm will comply.110 The eventual result of a PIR strategy is 
                                                                                                                           
 102. Ayres & Brathwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation, supra note 101, at 14-15. 
Ayres and Braithwaite also argue that the objections to the PIR based on the concerns 
about fairness of treating firms differently, predicated upon the equal protection clause, 
are unfounded. Id. at 38. 
 103. See Ayres & Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation, supra note 101, at 13; see 
also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 6. 
 104. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE REGULATION DEBATE, 137 (1992). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Schanze, supra note 38. 
 108. See AYRES & BRATHWAITE, supra note 90, at 137. 
 109. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 38 (2000). 
 110. See id. at 142. Ayres and Braithwaite identify three forms of partial industry 
regulation: dominant-firm strategies, fringe-firm strategies, and tournament competition 
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a “dual governance of individual markets.”111 Therefore, this regulatory 
bifurcation eventually creates two distinct playing fields governed by 
different rules.112 
Dual governance, though beneficial, is not without costs. The main 
problem is that such a system of regulation stimulates strategic responses 
by the firms to the regulatory fragmentation of the industry. Profit-
maximizing firms in such a segmented regulatory system will seek to shift 
or restructure their business in order to fall under the least costly 
regulatory regime. By creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, 
regulatory bifurcation and regulatory competition can inhibit cooperation 
among regulators to effectively address externalities in financial 
markets.113 It is argued that absent more coordination between regulators, 
such regulatory arbitrage may dilute efforts aimed at limiting excessive 
risk-taking in financial markets.114 
E. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS: LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND REGULATORY 
ARBITRAGE 
An additional major source of regulatory arbitrage lies in the nature 
of legal compliance and enforcement. Indeed, the “gap between the 
economic substance of a transaction and its legal and regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
strategies. See id. Built on tournament theory, yardstick competition derives some 
benchmarks from the average industry performance and rewards the firms passing the 
benchmarks. See id. For example, in labor contracts and especially in franchise 
agreements, the franchisor is not able (or it is not cost-justified for her) to monitor the 
level of effort of the franchisee; however, she can observe the level of output. Shleifer 
suggests that under certain assumptions, the yardstick competition can achieve an 
efficient outcome in this setting. See Shleifer, supra note 93, at 319-20. For example, as 
a cost-cutting strategy, the franchisor, who franchises the activities to several firms, can 
create a yardstick for the costs of the firms based on the average costs of other similar 
firms and create a competitive environment by announcing to franchisees that the firms 
with less costs than the benchmark can win certain prizes. Therefore, such a tournament 
design can create an environment in which the firm’s profits will depend on its ability to 
achieve certain output levels with lower costs than its competitors. See AYRES & 
BRATHWAITE, supra note 90, at 142. This kind of intervention ties suppliers’ profits to 
the performance of their competitors. Id. at 144. 
 111. Id. at 143. 
 112. HELEN A. GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 
(2001). 
 113. Engert, supra note 16, at 366-67. 
 114. Acharya et al., supra note 11, at 188; see also Houston et al., supra note 99, at 
1848. 
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treatment”115 exists because of the “legal system’s intrinsically limited 
ability to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions with 
sufficient precision.”116 This breeds opportunities for technical 
compliance with the legal rules that undermine the “underlying spirit and 
the purpose” on which the entire regulatory system or a specific law is 
built.117 Compliance of this sort, dubbed “creative compliance,” is well-
documented in the regulation literature.118 It involves “using the law to 
escape legal control without actually violating legal rules.”119 Creative 
compliance is made possible by the nature of legal rules, i.e., the “open 
texture” of the law. This arises from the limits “inherent in the nature of 
language, to the guidance which general language can provide,”120 
stemming partly from the “relative ignorance of fact[s]” and “relative 
indeterminacy of aims.”121 The type of regulatory arbitrage stemming 
from exploitation of gaps and loopholes can often occur within a single 
jurisdiction. 
The choice of a particular method of interpretation in financial 
regulation, enforcement, and adjudication can also significantly affect the 
problems facing the financial system. One source of regulatory arbitrage 
is associated with “legal formalism.” Legal formalism is usually 
understood as following the literal mandates of a rule, even if it ill serves 
its purpose. In general, “[f]ormalism implies a narrow approach to legal 
control—the use of clearly defined, highly administrable rules, an 
emphasis on uniformity, consistency and predictability, on the legal form 
of transactions and relationships and on literal interpretation.”122 Such an 
approach usually does not recognize “necessity of choice in penumbral 
areas of rules.”123 
The aim of creative compliance is to avoid legal control by appealing 
to formalism in legal interpretation, which is a relatively dominant 
                                                                                                                           
 115. Fleischer, supra note 18, at 229. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See KAREN YEUNG, SECURING COMPLIANCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH (2004). 
 118. See id. 
 119. D. McBarnet & C. Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the 
Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 848 (1991). 
 120. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1994). 
 121. Id. It in turn arises from the limited cognitive abilities of human beings because 
the knowledge of all possible combinations of contingencies could not be achieved by a 
human being. See id. It follows that the rules and regulation devised on this inherently 
flawed knowledge cannot escape those limits. 
 122. McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 119, at 848-49. 
 123. See HART, supra note 120, at 124-30. 
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approach in legal thinking and jurisprudence.124 The emphasis on literal 
interpretation highlights the role of definitions in legislation and rule 
making. The emphasis on the definitions constitutes a platform from 
which many of the intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
can potentially be launched. Needless to say, rule-based regulation (as 
opposed to principle-based regulation, which focuses on the broad 
objective rather than the means) creates vast opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage. As McBarnet argues, “[d]efinitions and criteria involving clear 
rules or thresholds make particularly valuable material for legal engineers 
to work on.”125 
In the context of hedge funds, definitional problems can sterilize 
regulatory attempts to address potential systemic risks posed by hedge 
funds. In fact, hedge funds define themselves by regulatory exemptions; 
this means that they do not have a shape of their own, and should mostly 
be viewed in light of the exogenous effects of regulations affecting their 
overall shape. This adaptative and dynamic aspect of hedge funds deepens 
the gap between their economic functions and regulatory categorizations. 
In addition, the responsive strategies of hedge funds to regulation induce 
every “otherwise non-hedge fund investment pool” to circumvent the 
restrictions of regulation by taking refuge under the hedge fund 
definitional umbrella. This move to acquire hedge fund status and make 
use of exemptions increases the heterogeneity of the statutorily-defined 
hedge funds.126 Consequently, the term hedge fund applies to many 
                                                                                                                           
 124. See generally, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing 
the definition of the word “client”); Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, [1940] 
AC 1014 (HL) 1022 (“The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be 
given their ordinary meaning.”). Although creative compliance is present in every area 
of regulation, it is more likely to be exploited in financial regulation and tax laws. This 
is because of the traditionally detailed, specific, and rule-based nature of tax and financial 
laws. 
 125. Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, 
Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, 72 
(Iain G. MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010). 
 126. For example, Payne criticizes the Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (AIFMD) for failing to adequately differentiate between hedge funds and 
private equity funds in regulating these two different types of alternative investment 
funds. See Payne, supra note 65, at 21-22; see also Jacob Rothschild, Europe Is Getting 
It Wrong on Financial Reform, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/f 
51bdb9a-4caa-11df-9977-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/JES2-A8E9] (arguing that the 
then proposed AIFMD is so broad in scope that it captures other firms as well, such as 
investment trusts in Britain). 
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heterogeneous funds with vastly heterogeneous investment strategies that 
comply with some black-letter rules of statutes and regulations. 
III. ADDRESSING REGULATORY ARBITRAGE: MARKET LIMITS VS. 
PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES 
Policymakers have expressed doubt over the merits of regulatory 
competition and have characterized regulatory arbitrage as a harmful 
phenomenon.127 They have also expressed concern over market 
fragmentation and localization resulting from inconsistent policy choices 
throughout the world (e.g., the U.S. Volcker Rule and the U.K. ring 
fencing).128 Purported gaps between global regulatory institutions and the 
global nature of finance have instead led to policy recommendations129 
favoring harmonization, centralization, and consolidation of regulatory 
regimes.130 It is argued that regulatory arbitrage, though beneficial, limits 
regulators’ ability to control systemic risk.131 Thus, the common concern 
for such proposals is the mitigation of systemic risks posed by hedge 
funds. 
On the other side of the spectrum, it is suggested that such a move 
toward regulatory harmonization is misguided because hedge funds did 
not significantly contribute to the financial crisis, nor are they likely to do 
so in the near future.132 
Instead, regulatory consolidation and global harmonization may 
result in heightened systemic risk because in such a regime, regulators 
tend to adopt similar strategies and thereby push financial institutions to 
                                                                                                                           
 127. Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Financial Stability Board and the 
Future of International Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE 
AND ITS REGULATION, supra note 11, at 64. 
 128. See id. For more on the concept of ring fencing, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-
Fencing, 87 S.CAL. L. REV. 69 (2013). 
 129. Lawrence G. Baxter, Understanding the Global in Global Finance and 
Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION, supra note 
11, at 28-29. 
 130. Regarding hedge fund regulation, see generally Engert, supra note 16 
(supporting regulatory cartelization to curb regulatory arbitrage) and Wulf A. Kaal, 
Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 389 (2011) 
(proposing measures to minimize opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds). 
 131. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 33. 
 132. See Roberta Romano, supra note 15. Romano sees the post-crisis regulatory 
response to hedge funds in the shadow of the historical hostility towards short-sellers. 
See id. 
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adopt similar business strategies. Deprived of the benefits of 
diversification, such regulatory systems, in which the risks of regulatory 
errors can easily be amplified, could be more prone to systemic risk than 
a decentralized regulatory regime.133 Regulatory arbitrage can thus be 
seen as a buffer against systemic regulatory and market failures.134 
More generally, empirical findings confirm the intuition that 
regulatory competition among legal systems can enhance the quality of 
corporate and securities laws by embracing bottom-up legal innovations 
and experimentation.135 Given the benefits of regulatory competition, 
increased harmonization is not the best solution, and it might produce 
unintended consequences. Instead, the mitigation of potential risks of 
regulatory arbitrage requires a shift in focus from regulatory 
harmonization to the quality of regulation within each and every 
individual regime. Such a balanced approach can deliver the benefits of 
regulatory competition, and in the meantime, can limit regulatory 
arbitrage of a kind that may result in a race to the bottom. 
The rest of this Article studies the ability of market forces in 
addressing the potential negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage. 
This Article will further elaborate how legal placebo effects, higher 
attrition rates among hedge funds, and the opaqueness of the hedge fund 
industry prevent markets from addressing potential risks and externalities 
of regulatory arbitrage on their own. 
A. DO MARKETS LIMIT REGULATORY ARBITRAGE? 
The demand for regulatory services is ultimately a function of the 
demand by financial institutions’ creditors and investors for safety and 
soundness of their counterparties. For example, if investors demand more 
protection, firms will try to meet that demand by registering with a well-
known regulator that provides reputation-enhancing regulation. Hedge 
funds will similarly demand high quality regulation that offers more 
protections for investors. Therefore, there are limits to a race to the bottom 
                                                                                                                           
 133. See Nabilou, supra note 13. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005). On the other hand, there is a 
third view on the unitary vs. diversified regulatory mechanisms, called “regulatory co-
opetition.” This view sides with the approach that “optimal governance requires a flexible 
mix of competition and cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between 
governmental and non-governmental actors.” See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37. 
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arising from regulatory arbitrage, and market forces can, to some extent, 
mitigate its effects. The firms’ ability to arbitrage between regulatory 
regimes is constrained by their willingness to be subjected to the least 
credible regulatory regime. In turn, financial institutions’ willingness to 
do so is a function of, among other things, their investors’ and 
counterparties’ willingness to engage in transactions with stable financial 
institutions within reliably stable and credible financial infrastructure.136 
Therefore, if quality of regulation matters for financial institutions 
because of reputational concerns, race to the bottom concerns from 
regulatory arbitrage will be largely unfounded. 
Recent empirical studies on regulatory arbitrage by banks find strong 
evidence of fund transfers by banks to less regulated markets. This finding 
holds even after controlling for the reverse causality, i.e., the endogenous 
regulatory responsiveness to capital market flows.137 In addition, strong 
evidence of arbitrage opportunities is documented in the form of banks’ 
foreign expansion decisions due to the “regulatory gaps in activity 
restriction, capital regulation, supervisory independence and strength, 
external audit, disclosure transparency, and loan classification.”138 
However, these studies suggest that in the absence of strong institutional 
infrastructure and legal environment that includes protections for property 
and creditor rights, lax regulation by itself is not sufficient to give rise to 
massive capital flows from heavily-regulated to lightly-regulated 
jurisdictions because “strong regulations . . . may serve as a signal of 
quality and stability.”139 Indeed, these findings demonstrate that “cross-
country differences in regulations have a much more pronounced effect 
on bank flows if the recipient country has an advanced economy, strong 
creditor rights, strong property rights, and a high degree of information 
sharing among investors.”140 
Therefore, the importance of the quality of regulation and its effect 
on regulatory arbitrage mitigates the concerns for a potential race to the 
bottom, which is the main concern about regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, 
empirical works confirm the theory that regulatory competition separates 
countries based on their financial and securities regulatory systems 
                                                                                                                           
 136. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 131 
(2006). 
 137. See generally Houston, Lin & Ma, supra note 99. 
 138. Id. at 1847. 
 139. Id. at 1848. 
 140. Id. 
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between jurisdictions catering to opportunistic managers and jurisdictions 
attracting managers or issuers seeking to signal credibility and quality. 
Investors and companies identify themselves accordingly by registering 
with those regulators.141 In turn, a rational investor will discount 
investments in poor-quality issuers, offsetting the risk of opportunistic 
behavior by managers.142 
In addition, a regulatory jurisdiction’s established reputation and 
credibility can be translated into financial premiums for financial 
institutions regulated by the authorities of that jurisdiction. For example, 
banks can build their reputation by registering with a jurisdiction whose 
regulatory regime offers a credible deposit insurance scheme or stricter 
prudential regulation.143 By the same token, competitive threats to the 
U.S. banking system from offshore financial centers in the U.S. dollar 
deposit market are limited by reputational considerations.144 Therefore, 
the quality of regulation is of crucial importance; reputation-enhancing 
regulation is less prone to regulatory arbitrage than anti-competitive 
regulation.145 
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF MARKET FORCES IN ADDRESSING REGULATORY 
ARBITRAGE BY HEDGE FUNDS 
Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the impact of reputation-
enhancing regulation on regulatory arbitrage by banking entities, less 
research has been conducted on the importance of reputation-enhancing 
regulation on regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. Therefore, it is apt to 
ask how much a reputation for being regulated by credible regulators 
matters for hedge funds. This Article accepts the proposition that a firm’s 
appetite regarding reputational benefits will vary depending on the nature 
                                                                                                                           
 141. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 950 (1997). 
 142. Id. They further argue that regulatory competition is a check on the performance 
of self-regulatory organizations (such as rating agencies). Regulatory competition in 
these areas can provide the investors and market participants with alternatives for poor 
regulatory performance. Therefore, such a regulatory design in fact complements private 
regulatory mechanisms. 
 143. ALEXANDER, DHUMALE & EATWELL, supra note 126, at 136. 
 144. Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global 
Economy (1995). 
 145. ALEXANDER, DHUMALE & EATWELL, supra note 126, at 136. 
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of the firm. Consequently, the arguments for regulation as a signal of 
quality may matter more to some firms than others. 
This section argues that because of legal “placebo effects,” higher 
attrition rates in the hedge fund industry, and the inherent opaqueness of 
hedge funds, reputational concerns that may arise from regulation are of 
less importance for hedge funds compared to mainstream financial 
institutions. These relatively lower reputational costs usually fail to 
outweigh the economic benefits of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds, 
and thus make regulatory arbitrage economically more attractive for 
hedge funds than for banks, mutual funds, and pension funds. 
1. Legal Placebo Effects and Hedge Fund Reputational Concerns 
Introduction of new laws and regulations can change investors’ risk 
perception of the regulated activity or entity. In other words, laws have 
placebo effects, which “manipulate[] individuals’ expectations regarding 
a risk that the law addresses.”146 Such an effect alters the welfare of 
regulated individuals and firms separate from the effects arising from the 
actual enforcement of the law.147 Legal placebo effects can cause a 
convergence or divergence of the individuals’ perception of the 
probability and magnitude of risks with regard to the objective risk. 
“Positive placebo effect” of a law entails the mitigation of an 
overestimated risk by individuals as they perceive the legislation as a risk 
mitigating factor.148 In other words, in some cases the law’s effect is to 
reduce the level of perceived risks in individuals who overestimate the 
risks had no legislation been passed. 
The law’s effect on the risk perception of individuals and institutions 
will vary based on their level of sophistication. Put differently, legal 
placebo effects are of asymmetric nature for different categories of 
investors. Therefore, positive placebo effects of laws (the ones which 
reduce the overestimated perception of risk)149 depend on the level of 
sophistication of regulated entities. For institutional, accredited, and 
                                                                                                                           
 146. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating 
Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 57 (2006). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 60-61 (describing positive placebo effect, negative placebo effect, 
positive anti-placebo effect and negative anti-placebo effect of law). For the implications 
of the placebo effect theory for the allocation of regulatory resources, see Amitai Aviram, 
Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 739 (2012). 
 149. Aviram, supra note 146, at 57. 
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qualified investors, such an effect is less than that for unsophisticated 
investors whose perception of risk is more prone to cognitive biases. 
Based on this analysis, positive placebo effects of laws have 
disproportionate effects on hedge funds and banks. This is mostly due to 
the fact that the investor base, counterparties, and creditors of hedge funds 
are more sophisticated than those of banks, mutual funds, and pension 
funds.150 
Therefore, compared to hedge funds, the reputational effects of being 
subject to regulation by a credible regulator are amplified for banks whose 
clients are unsophisticated investors and do not have adequate resources 
at their disposal to assess the true risks of these institutions. This implies 
that there is a heightened incentive for mainstream financial institutions 
such as banks, mutual funds, and pension funds, which deal with 
unsophisticated investors on a daily basis, to signal to their investors and 
depositors about their safety and soundness by registering with credible 
regulators. However, there are no such amplified incentives for hedge 
funds because such a registration with a credible regulator cannot 
dramatically manipulate the risk perception of hedge funds’ sophisticated 
investors, creditors, and counterparties. This means that regulation-
induced reputation matters less for hedge funds, and hence they can 
relatively easily engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
2. Attrition Rate in the Hedge Fund Industry and Reputational Concerns 
Repeated interactions are seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of 
evolutionary cooperation based on reputation. On the other hand, limited 
future interactions breed opportunistic behavior. Hedge funds display an 
extraordinarily high level of attrition compared to mainstream financial 
institutions such as banks, mutual funds, and pension funds.151 Because of 
                                                                                                                           
 150. In some European countries such as Luxembourg and Germany, hedge funds can 
be marketed to non-profesional investors. However, these jurisdictions are exceptions to 
the rule, which requires that investors in a hedge funds should be sophisticated. See 
Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs. 
Indirect Regulation, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 183, 185-235 (2015) 
 151. See Michael R. King & Philip Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: 
Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 286 
(2009) (“One estimate suggests hedge fund attrition rates ranged between 3.8% and 5.1% 
per year between 1999 and 2007 (ISFL, 2008). Other studies use the number of funds 
that stop reporting to the Lipper TASS database. According to this proxy, the average life 
span of a hedge fund is 40 months, with a median life of 31 months. Fewer than 15% of 
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high attrition rates among hedge funds, they have relatively shorter time 
horizons and one-dimensional relationships with their counterparties and 
regulators. Such limited future interactions mitigate the effects of 
reputational concerns and market discipline, and increase the likelihood 
of their opportunistic behavior. 
There is a widespread concern in the literature on corporate 
governance with regard to hedge fund short-termism.152 Short-termism 
occurs in inter-temporal choices. These choices are usually made by 
“decisions in which the timing of costs and benefits are spread out over 
time.”153 The dispersion of costs and benefits over time accompanied by 
the conflicts of interest of the principals and agents in an economic firm 
highlight the importance of the short- and long-term horizons, which 
might result in compromising greater long-term benefits for fewer short-
term benefits.154 Even in the absence of conflicts of interest, managers or 
economic agents might be prone to myopia, making it difficult for them 
                                                                                                                           
hedge funds last longer than 6 years, while 60% disappear with 3 years. . . . Directional 
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61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 80, 80 (2005). 
 152. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, et al., The 
Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) 
(suggesting that claims that hedge fund activism adversely impacts firms are not 
empirically tenable). 
 153. George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 
J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 181 (1989). 
 154. GREGORY JACKSON & ANASTASIA PETRAKI, UNDERSTANDING SHORT-TERMISM: 
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, http://www.sofi-goettingen.de/fileadmin/Texta 
rchiv/WIP2/Praesentationen/jackson-petraki_short-termism.pdf [https://perma.cc/6276-
FKET]. 
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to accurately weigh the long-term consequences of their decisions.155 
Increased hedge fund activism, though beneficial for corporate 
governance and performance of firms,156 gave rise to concerns about 
hedge funds’ short-termism with regard to the corporate governance of 
the firms they acquire.157 Though a concrete and fully-entrenched case for 
hedge fund short-termism is yet to be made,158 concerns have been raised 
about the harms that hedge funds might cause while pursuing their own 
self-interest.159 
The high attrition rate among hedge funds can contribute to a 
tendency to be short-sighted and hence create incentives for opportunistic 
behavior in hedge funds as they approach the end-game, a stage in 
repeated interactions that undermines the reputational effects. Hence, due 
to this higher attrition rate, hedge funds will not be as strongly subject to 
market discipline as their counterparties and creditors. Commercial and 
investment banks, mutual funds, and other financial institutions with 
lower attrition rate often have multi-dimensional financial relationships 
with other market participants and regulators. This long-term relationship 
often creates much stronger reputational effects for these institutions, 
reducing their incentives to behave opportunistically and misuse the 
standard market conventions to their advantage. On the contrary: 
                                                                                                                           
 155. Id. (citing David Marginson & Laurie McAulay, Exploring the Debate on Short-
termism: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 273 (2008)). 
 156. See Stefano Gatti & Chiara Battistini, Hedge Funds’ Activism: A New Trend of 
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hedge funds typically have a single-product business with the sole 
focus of maximising returns from trading in financial markets, and as 
such are subject to fewer constraints than other institutions. Hedge 
funds are also able to have more concentrated portfolios than other 
institutions, so that for a given portfolio size, they are able to obtain 
larger positions in individual markets, and to change those positions 
more quickly. The result is that they can be completely opportunistic 
when it suits them.160 
Higher attrition rates among hedge funds and their shorter time horizons 
undermine the importance of reputation for hedge funds. Therefore, it 
seems that regulation-induced reputational concerns in the decision to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage are of less importance to hedge funds than 
to well-established and reputation-sensitive financial institutions such as 
banks and mutual funds. 
3. Transparency and Reputational Concerns in the Hedge Fund Industry 
Reputation matters more in transparent markets than in opaque ones. 
Information disclosure can enhance or damage the reputation of firms in 
transparent markets faster than it does in opaque markets. Therefore, 
transparency enhances the importance of reputation, and the importance 
of regulation-induced reputational costs decreases the likelihood of 
regulatory arbitrage to less-reputable jurisdictions. However, due to lower 
reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds (because of the 
absence of mandatory disclosure to markets), it is less costly for hedge 
funds to engage in regulatory arbitrage compared to other mainstream 
financial institutions, which are subject to mandatory disclosure. 
It has been well established how information asymmetry can result 
in market failure.161 The transparency deficit and asymmetric information 
are especially problematic in financial markets because of the nature of 
financial products and the inter-temporal nature of financial transactions. 
Financial services are generally viewed as “credence goods,” the quality 
of which is not ascertainable even after their purchase and use.162 In 
                                                                                                                           
 160. RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., HEDGE FUNDS, FINANCIAL STABILITY, AND MARKET 
INTEGRITY 5 (1999). 
 161. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 162. Alessio M. Pacces & Heremans Dirk, Regulation of Banking and Financial 
Markets, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL 2, at 9-10 (Alessio M. Pacces 
& R. J. Van den Bergh eds., 2011). 
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credence goods, which have the highest level of information asymmetry, 
mandatory information disclosure requirements can significantly mitigate 
the likelihood of market failure. In addition, the importance of trust and 
reputation in inter-temporal financial transactions usually exacerbates the 
negative effects of information asymmetries. For example, banks are less 
willing to lend for longer periods of time and depositors are less willing 
to deposit their money in a financial institution from which they cannot 
withdraw on short notice (i.e., longer lock-ups).163 Since the level of 
lending will be far lower than its socially optimal level in this setting, 
transparency and information disclosure can help mitigate information 
asymmetry and help reduce funding costs of financial institutions. Being 
a well-known, reputable, and trustworthy borrower is essential for 
attracting, concentrating, and channeling investors’ scattered savings into 
economically productive activities.164 
Market benefits of information disclosure include enhanced 
liquidity, lower cost of capital, and better firm valuation.165 In the absence 
of a reliable information disclosure system in financial markets, the 
uninformed investors cannot tell the “lemons” from the “peaches.” 
Therefore, to hedge against possible losses as a result of trading with 
informed investors, market participants will discount the purchase price 
of the stock and inflate its selling price, reflecting the probability of 
trading with an informed counterparty multiplied by the potential 
information surplus of the counterparty.166 This increased bid-ask spread 
will decrease liquidity for a particular stock.167 As Akerlof predicts, such 
                                                                                                                           
 163. By the same token, short-term demandable deposits are considered a source of 
market discipline that curtail excessive risk-taking by banks. See C. W. Calomiris & C. 
M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, 
AM. ECON. REV. 497, 497 (1991). 
 164. This in turn translates into the maturity transformation function at the heart of 
financial intermediation. 
 165. Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 97 (2001) 
(arguing that corporate disclosure can mitigate the adverse selection problem and 
increase market liquidity by leveling the playing field among investors); see C. Leuz & 
P. Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: 
A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105398 [https://perma.cc/GX6Y-
5D2Y]. 
 166. Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 165. 
 167. See Verrecchia, supra note 165; Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 165. 
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an instance of asymmetric information may lead to the collapse of the 
entire market for that product.168 
Even in unregulated markets, high-performing firms have disclosure 
incentives to signal their quality and distinguish themselves from poorly 
performing firms.169 However, the main reason for market failure in 
providing the optimal level of information is the problem of externalities. 
Despite being socially optimal, information disclosure might not be 
privately optimal for a specific firm.170 Similar to the problem of 
commons or the “impure public goods” nature of information, this 
problem exists due to the externalities arising from non-excludability of 
information when it is out at large in the market.171 In the context of 
information disclosure, such externalities drive a wedge between 
privately and socially optimal levels of disclosure.172 As an example, 
Admati and Pfleiderer show that in a model of voluntary disclosure by 
firms in financial markets, externalities arise when firm values are 
correlated.173 In such a setting, the costly disclosure of one firm can be 
used in the valuation of other firms, and hence can generate a free-rider 
problem.174 Such disclosure can help the competitors of a disclosing firm 
while hurting the issuer.175 In this case, the amount of disclosure is often 
suboptimal and regulation can improve social welfare.176 In addition, 
Fishman and Hagerty argue that mandatory disclosure is necessary in 
markets in which the information about the product is relatively difficult 
to understand.177 As mentioned above, since financial products and 
services are credence goods, this argument can be readily applied to 
financial services. 
On the other hand, trust in inter-temporal transactions can be 
considered a public good, and leaving it to the forces of markets can result 
                                                                                                                           
 168. See Akerlof, supra note 161, at 490. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 165. 
 171. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 34 (2004). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure 
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479 (2010). 
 174. Id. at 512. 
 175. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice 
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (1999). 
 176. Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 173, at 482. 
 177. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary 
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
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594 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
in its under-provision. The trust deficit in financial markets calls for 
government intervention, as do other sectors of the economy.178 Aghion 
et al. demonstrate that in a cross-section of countries, the lack of trust 
breeds higher levels of government intervention even though the 
corruption in government itself is a public knowledge.179 Among financial 
institutions, hedge funds and hedge fund products have an established 
reputation for complexity and opaqueness. Such opaqueness intensifies 
the trust deficit and amplifies information asymmetry in hedge fund 
products. Therefore, notwithstanding the theories arguing that voluntary 
disclosure itself is a separating equilibrium,180 such a signaling 
mechanism by firms might become too costly because of the externalities 
involved in the voluntary disclosure setting. The proprietary nature of 
hedge funds’ information exacerbates this problem and hinders more 
information disclosure. 
There are additional reasons for hedge funds’ non-disclosure, which 
can convolute the signaling effect of disclosure and further dissuade 
hedge funds from voluntary disclosure. Some hedge funds might be 
saturated with investors’ money and cannot take on additional 
investments. Accordingly, they may stop disclosing information. Other 
hedge funds might not disclose information because of the regulatory 
limits on the number of their investors. In addition, the prohibition on 
public solicitation by hedge funds further decreases their incentives to 
disclose information. Since disclosure, to a certain extent, might be 
considered public solicitation, it may trigger the automatic application of 
otherwise dormant rules to hedge funds. Therefore, not only do hedge 
funds have no incentive to disclose, but certain statutory provisions also 
prohibit or discourage them from doing so, thereby refuting the optimality 
of voluntary disclosure in the context of hedge fund regulation. Moreover, 
under the voluntary disclosure mechanism, there is a likelihood that some 
hedge funds might disclose information opportunistically (i.e., by 
disclosing less valuable information) or they may cherry pick the 
information to be disclosed. Since all these factors will discourage the 
                                                                                                                           
 178. After all, this was the same reason for most of the bank runs and systemic risks 
in the history of finance. 
 179. Philippe Aghion et al., Regulation and Distrust, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1015 (2010). 
 180. The argument is that even in the absence of mandatory disclosure, outperforming 
firms will disclose and underperforming firms will not, hence disclosure itself will be a 
separating equilibrium that will distinguish highly-performing firms from poorly 
performing ones. 
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disclosure of information, it will lose its signaling effect. Therefore, 
disclosing firms will not be rewarded with more money from investors. 
To summarize the argument, the main market mechanism that can 
inhibit regulatory arbitrage is the reputational effect arising from the 
regulatory infrastructure, such as regulation offering adequate protections 
for property rights, creditor rights, and reliable disclosure mechanisms. 
Indeed, reputation, which is induced by regulation, is a compensation for 
the costs of regulation for regulated firms and will keep regulated firms 
where they are, instead of encouraging them to migrate to other 
jurisdictions. However, in the absence of mandatory disclosure systems 
for hedge funds, no regulatory scheme and jurisdiction can be credible 
enough to justify its costs and hence cannot inhibit a race to the bottom. 
Therefore, the firms registered in those jurisdictions will not enjoy a 
premium because the regulation cannot sufficiently enhance reputational 
benefits. A regulatory regime that generates no reputational benefit for 
the regulated industry to compensate the costs of regulation is especially 
prone to regulatory arbitrage. Since the lack of transparency lowers the 
reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds, hedge funds 
will be more likely to engage in regulatory arbitrage than their mainstream 
counterparts. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES TO REGULATORY ARBITRAGE BY 
HEDGE FUNDS 
To address the problems associated with regulatory arbitrage, several 
proposals have been put forward. These proposals range from equivalence 
requirements,181 strengthening regulatory coordination,182 cooperation, 
regulatory co-opetition,183 and regulatory harmonization, to regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
 181. Dirk A. Zetzsche, Competitiveness of Financial Centers in Light of Financial 
and Tax Law Equivalence Requirements, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND 
ITS REGULATION, supra note 11, at 391 (arguing that equivalence requirements are likely 
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 182. Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 309; see also James Chapman, Stéphane 
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 183. Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37. 
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consolidation,184 and unification,185 perhaps leading to the creation of a 
World Financial Organization akin to the World Trade Organization186 or 
a Global Economic Council for overseeing the stability of the 
international financial system.187 Although regulatory globalization can 
address cross-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, it will fall short of 
addressing intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage arising from 
definitional problems.188 Based on the idiosyncratic features of the hedge 
fund industry, this Article proposes an approach that can mitigate the 
negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage regardless of whether the 
arbitrage opportunity is intra-jurisdictional or inter-jurisdictional. 
Given the benefits of regulatory competition, which presupposes 
some degree of regulatory arbitrage, the optimal amount of regulatory 
arbitrage is not zero. The aim is to maximize the benefits of regulatory 
arbitrage, while minimizing its externalities. As discussed earlier in the 
debate about regulatory competition, regulatory arbitrage facilitates the 
formation of a meta-market for legal and regulatory regimes within which 
it is possible to trade governance under one regime for another. In such a 
market, regulation itself is a commodity, and hedge funds will shop for 
the regulatory regime that most benefits them. They will buy into the 
system when they are satisfied that the marginal cost of the regime equals 
or is less than the corresponding marginal benefit. Therefore, while the 
initial intention of regulation is to monitor markets, regulatory arbitrage 
provides opportunities for firms to themselves regulate and affect 
behavioral changes in regulators. It follows that addressing the problems 
of regulatory arbitrage does not necessarily call for its total elimination, 
for it would be neither possible nor optimal. 
To address regulatory arbitrage, special attention should be paid to 
incentives-related effects of regulation, i.e., a regulation that imposes 
                                                                                                                           
 184. See, e.g., RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL 
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additional costs on the regulated industry should offset those costs by 
offering the industry benefits of being subject to a specific regulator. 
Ceteris paribus, the regulatory system in which the marginal benefits of 
regulation equal its marginal costs will be arbitrage-proof.189 Therefore, 
the design of a financial regulatory regime should result in an equilibrium 
from which hedge funds have no incentive to deviate without making 
themselves worse off. 
The immediate conceivable benefit of regulation is the reputational 
benefit that registering with certain regulators can create for financial 
institutions. However, such reputational benefits will not be sufficient to 
hinder hedge funds from regulatory arbitrage, as the benefits are not 
sufficient to off-set the costs of regulation, thereby inducing hedge funds 
to arbitrage between different regimes. Thus, the regulation should be 
designed to not only provide benefits, but also impose as minimal a cost 
as possible on hedge funds. 
Following the underlying efficiency criterion and incentive 
compatibility of hedge fund regulation, regulators should provide the 
sector negatively affected by regulation with incentives to stay within the 
limits of its rules. One of the examples of such an exclusive advantage 
offered for regulated entities is illustrated in the banking industry.190 
Traditionally, the banking sector is heavily-regulated. To off-set the 
burden of such heavy regulations, regulators have granted the banks 
monopolies on certain financial transactions by offering them valuable 
bank charters.191 This protects the banking industry from outside 
competition, hence giving it sufficient countervailing benefits (subsidies) 
vis-à-vis the costs of heavier regulation.192 
                                                                                                                           
 189. This is conditional upon the comparative benefits of regulation; this does not 
necessarily mean that such a regulatory system should adhere to the least restrictive 
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 190. See Rebecca S. Demsetz, Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, Banks with 
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 191. See id. 
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The history of banking shows that the advent of the shadow banking 
sector and the accompanying loss of bank charter value posed a major 
challenge to banks. For example, a decrease in bank charter value induced 
more risk-taking behavior by banks.193 Prior to the loss of charter value, 
the charter by itself was considered a valuable asset for banks and losing 
the charter in the event of insolvency was one of the factors that 
incentivized banks to take less risk.194 However, with decreasing charter 
value, this incentive was diluted and banks began to take more risks.195 
A more recent example of such off-setting benefits can be found in 
the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“AIFMD”). This 
Directive introduces the passport mechanism for hedge funds, which 
enables them to market their products throughout the European Union 
(“EU”) after registration with an EU Member State.196 Introduction of 
such a mechanism is best understood as an off-setting mechanism for 
heavier regulation of hedge funds under the AIFMD with the aim of 
preventing European hedge funds from relocating to other loosely-
regulated jurisdictions.197 However, it remains to be seen how effective 
this strategy will be in preventing regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds or 
even in attracting new hedge funds to Europe. To be sure, such benefits 
will be measured against regulatory costs which are imposed on hedge 
funds by such strict regulations. It seems that it is only by creating a 
competitive edge or providing subsidies to firms that regulators can 
discourage regulatory arbitrage. Otherwise, the competitive pressure from 
the lightly-regulated financial institutions will generate positional 
externalities198 and will incentivize more and more financial institutions 
to shift their business to such jurisdictions. 
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This Article argues that the indirect regulation of hedge funds 
through banking entities, which are already heavily regulated, will impose 
the lowest possible cost on the hedge fund industry. This is especially 
important to curtail regulatory arbitrage. As already suggested, a 
regulatory framework that only imposes costs without offering 
countervailing benefits is prone to regularly arbitrage. Indirect regulation 
of hedge funds through banks will make it redundant for regulators to 
devise regulations, which would create additional countervailing benefits 
for the hedge fund industry to create an equilibrium from which hedge 
funds do not have any incentives to deviate. The main rationale for 
shifting the focus from hedge funds to banks for the purpose of regulating 
hedge funds is that the banking entities are already heavily subsidized; the 
cost of indirect regulation of hedge funds by banking entities would be 
off-set by the already existing subsidies within the banking industry. 
One of the controversial debates fueled by the recent crisis was the 
debate on whether to regulate hedge funds directly or indirectly.199 On the 
one hand, U.S. and U.K. regulators and the hedge fund industry itself 
supported the indirect regulation of hedge funds through regulated banks. 
On the other hand, the EU supported a direct regulatory framework for 
hedge funds. This divergence of opinion was deepened by the events of 
the global financial crisis, including accusations of hedge funds’ abusive 
short-selling practices. In the end, the clash of the two opposing views 
resulted in a compromise. It seems that one of the factors giving rise to 
such a compromise was an increasingly stringent attitude in the U.S. 
toward hedge fund regulation after the change of administration.200 This 
change of policy paved the way for the realization of European views on 
hedge fund regulation. The efforts to rein in hedge funds culminated in 
the G20 London Summit in April 2009, in which all parties agreed that 
hedge funds and their advisers should be subject to mandatory registration 
and disclosure requirements.201 Nevertheless, this Article argues that 
indirect regulation can better address the problems of regulatory arbitrage 
by hedge funds. 
The commands of law directed at creating behavioral changes in its 
subjects can be applied directly or indirectly. Direct or entity regulation 
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includes “regulatory measures focusing on the regulation of the industry 
itself (as a discrete activity or as part of the broader, regulated investment 
services universe).”202 Thus, direct regulation implies that regulation is 
directed at the hedge fund entity itself or at the activities directly or 
immediately conducted by the funds. In contrast, indirect regulation is a 
type of regulation the imperatives or commands of which are mediated by 
or transmitted through an intermediary to the primarily intended regulated 
entity or activity. Indeed, in indirect regulation of hedge funds, regulators 
directly regulate financial institutions that provide financial services to 
hedge funds or their counterparties.203 This involves “market discipline-
inspired regulatory measures targeting the creditors and counterparties of 
hedge funds (mainly, but not exclusively, their prime brokers and 
securities brokers).”204 Therefore, a key element in the indirect approach 
is the regulator’s reliance on market participants, namely to reward well-
managed firms and to punish poorly-managed ones.205 
There are several reasons why direct regulation of hedge funds 
cannot effectively address potential hedge fund externalities.206 The 
regulatory arbitrage-generating effect of direct regulation is one of the 
repeatedly-pronounced arguments against direct regulation.207 Indeed, 
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one of the primary concerns discouraging targeted regulation of hedge 
funds is that not only will the imposition of such regulation result in 
competitive disadvantages for the jurisdiction imposing the rule, but that 
it will also lead to the offshore relocation of hedge funds. This is largely 
because hedge funds, similar to other corporate entities, have an exit 
option and will “vote with their feet.”208 This relocation has adverse 
consequences for regulators and the jurisdiction involved. It can deprive 
the rule-imposing jurisdiction of tax revenues generated from hedge funds 
as well as of the job opportunities created by them. Indeed, the fear of 
hedge fund relocation was one of the factors that played a role in the 
regulatory forbearance in imposing stricter rules on the funds prior to the 
financial crisis.209 
Therefore, since regulation cannot offer substantial reputational 
benefits (subsidies) for hedge funds, those benefits are unlikely to off-set 
the costs of direct regulation. In order to effectively address the potential 
systemic risks of hedge funds while minimizing the opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage, the funds should be indirectly regulated through their 
prime brokers, executing brokers, investment managers and advisers, and 
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subject to certain regulatory qualifications on their investors and 
investments.210 
In addition, because of the value of the proprietary information, it 
seems implausible to suggest the imposition of mandatory disclosure as a 
means of direct regulation. Furthermore, voluntary disclosure involves 
externalities, which can inhibit hedge funds from optimally sourcing the 
information. Thus, indirect regulation of hedge funds can better address 
these problems, as banks and prime brokers are already subject to 
mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Delegation of hedge fund regulation to the counterparties of hedge 
funds not only decreases the chances of regulatory capture, but also 
increases efficiency by providing incentives to regulators to compete with 
each other. Furthermore, since indirect regulation of hedge funds will be 
implemented by multiple prime brokers, it provides for the possibility of 
decentralized enforcement of the rules that are initially applied to the 
banking sector. 
It might be argued that such an indirect regulation will impose 
additional restrictions on hedge funds’ counterparties and thereby cause 
certain regulatory arbitrage opportunities for hedge funds’ prime brokers 
and other counterparties. However, banks—the only depository 
institutions—are much more sensitive to reputational considerations than 
hedge funds, especially when it comes to enhancing their reputation by 
registering with a regulator that provides strong and credible deposit 
insurance. Accordingly, the costs of regulatory arbitrage for banks are 
more significant than those for hedge funds. Also, given the relatively 
more harmonized international regulatory framework for banks,211 which 
are the main counterparties of hedge funds, regulatory arbitrage by banks 
would be of less systemic significance than regulatory arbitrage by hedge 
funds. 
CONCLUSION 
The interplay and dynamics of financial regulation and hedge funds’ 
responses to such regulation can culminate in regulatory arbitrage in the 
global financial markets. This Article argues that the differential 
regulation of homogenous financial activities giving rise to regulatory 
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fragmentation is the main source of regulatory arbitrage. However, the 
differential regulatory treatment should not be considered a necessary 
evil; instead, it may often yield more efficient outcomes than its 
alternatives (i.e., consolidated regulatory regimes) do in certain market 
settings. This Article focuses on regulatory competition as a driving force 
for differential regulatory treatment of homogenous financial activities, 
which can result in fragmented regulatory schemes and a dual system of 
governance. 
There are market limits to regulatory arbitrage. For example, 
empirical studies suggest that regulatory arbitrage is limited by 
reputational effects. Legal infrastructure, which signals quality, plays an 
important role in the relocation decisions of financial firms preventing a 
race to the bottom. Nevertheless, such an argument cannot plausibly be 
applied to hedge funds. The level of sophistication in the investor base of 
the hedge fund industry inhibits legal placebo effects that could otherwise 
amplify the impact of regulation-enhanced reputation. Furthermore, 
hedge funds’ high attrition rate and limited transparency can also diminish 
the reputational and credibility costs for hedge funds. Such indiscernible 
reputational costs facilitate hedge fund regulatory arbitrage and do not 
disincentivize hedge funds from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. 
Therefore, this Article suggests that to reduce the likelihood of regulatory 
arbitrage, instead of regulating hedge funds directly, the strategy should 
focus on regulating hedge funds indirectly through their counterparties, 
creditors, and investors for whom reputational costs are significantly 
higher. The theoretical framework and recommendations put forward in 
this Article can easily lend themselves to empirical tests, especially in an 
era in which hedge funds are coming out of the shadows due to the 
information disclosure obligations imposed on them by the post-crisis 
financial reforms on both sides of the Atlantic. 
